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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
PARKER McELWAIN,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
SHIRLEY McELWAIN,

Case No. 900244-CA

Defendant/Respondent

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear the above entitled appeal is conferred
upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended 78-2a-3(2) (g) .
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a decision rendered by the Honorable
F.L. Gunnell, Judge of the First Judicial District Court of Box
Elder County, State of Utah on Plaintiff's Petition to Modify the
Divorce Decree.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

The Trial Court erred in its finding that there had been

no showing of a substantial change in circumstances allowing the
Court to modify the Divorce Decree by ceasing or substantially
reducing alimony.
2.

The Trial Court incorrectly applied the law by ruling

that the voluntary nature of some of the Plaintiff!s changes in

circumstances made those changes, per se, inapplicable towards
modifying a Divorce Decree.
3.

The

Trial

Court

abused

its

discretion

in

awarding

attorney's fees to the Defendant under the circumstances of this
case.
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable F. L.
Gunnell, Judge of the First Judicial District Court of Box Elder
County, State of Utah on the 6th day of April, 199 0.

Judge

Gunnell denied Plaintiff's Motion to Modify the Decree and refused
to abate the remainder of the alimony payments from the time of
the filing of the Petition.

Judge Gunnell granted

Defendant

Judgment for unpaid alimony and one-half of Defendant's attorney's
fees against Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff filed for this appeal with the Utah Court of
Appeals on May

4, 1990 from the Amended Order signed by the

Honorable F. L. Gunnell on the 24th day of April, 1990.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
That the parties were originally married on May 11, 1977 in
the State of California.

Sometime after that they moved

to

Brigham City, Utah and remained there for the majority of the
marriage.
Approximately two (2) years before the divorce the Plaintiff
was transferred to California through his employment.
was

reluctant

to

move

with

Plaintiff

to

Defendant

California

and

consequently, on January 14, 1987 Plaintiff filed for divorce.
2

There

were

no

children

born

as

issue

of

this

marriage

and

therefore, the resolution of this matter depended mainly on a
division of property.

(Tp.19)

The parties were officially divorced by Stipulation

in a

hearing before the Honorable Gordon J. Low on the 22nd day of
February, 1988.

The Decree of Divorce specified in Paragraph 4

that,
"commencing September 1, 1987, Plaintiff was
ordered to pay the Defendant the sum of $550
per month, as and for alimony and said alimony
shall terminate at the end of August, 1990."
Shortly after the divorce, Plaintiff remarried and took on
the responsibility for two (2) stepchildren who were not receiving
any support from their natural father.

(Tp. 37)

At the time of the divorce, Plaintiff reported income of
approximately $48,000 per year.

Defendant reported to be working

half time at the library at Bunderson Elementary School, making
approximately $375 per month for half time work.
That Plaintiff continued his employment from the time of the
divorce through the 3rd day of June, 1989.

In April of 1989,

Plaintiff received a letter from his employer, the Department of
the Air Force, dated April 18, 1989 informing Plaintiff that
unless he

1989 he would

lose

forever, his lump sum annuity payment out of his retirement.

(Tp.

27)

retired

no

later than June

3,

Plaintiff had been suffering from severe stomach ulcers for

some time (Tp. 20) and did not want to lose his right to a lump
sum payment

from his annuity.

Plaintiff attended

3

a briefing

regarding this issue and determined from the information provided
by his employer that he would retire effective June 3, 1989.

(Tp.

21)
The Divorce Decree specified that Defendant would receive a
share of Plaintiff's retirement pursuant to the Woodward formula.
Plaintiff assumed that with the monthly retirement payment and her
share

of

the

lump

sum

annuity,

that

Defendant

would

be

substantially benefited by his accepting retirement at age 60.
Plaintiff had put in 3 5 years with the Federal government.

(Tp.

21-22)
Plaintiff immediately filed a Petition to Modify the Decree
of Divorce on the grounds that his income had dropped by 75% and
that his expenses had increased.
For various reasons the hearing on the Petition was continued
once

because

Defendant

fired

her previous

counsel

and

hired

Attorney Jon Bunderson and once again, because of a physical
injury that Plaintiff had incurred.
During the period of time while the parties waited for the
hearing on the Petition, the government did not get around to
paying any of the retirement benefits to either party until almost
the end of 1989.

(Tp. 25)

Finally in a letter written January

25, 1990 and mailed to Representative d i n g e r

in the State of

Pennsylvania, who was looking into the matter on behalf of the
Plaintiff,

the

United

States

Office

of

Personnel

Management

informed Plaintiff for the first time that because he had an exwife, who under the terms of the divorce was eligible to receive
4

a portion of his retirement benefits, that Plaintiff was not
entitled to take advantage of his lump sum annuity benefits after
all.
Plaintiff, depended upon his receiving the lump sum annuity,
which he had been told would be close to $30,000.

Plaintiff had

borrowed against the future receipt of the lump sum annuity to
move his family from California to Pennsylvania and purchased and
remodelled a very small and simple farm in the backwoods of
Pennsylvania, leaving Plaintiff with a debt load of over $80,000.
(Tp. 23)
Finally, in late December of 1989 the government started
paying Plaintiff his regular retirement benefits, including a
makeup check for the months wherein he was left without any
income.

(Tp. 26) There was no letter or documentation with these

checks to inform Plaintiff as to what had been sent by the
Retirement

to the

Defendant, although he was aware that a

substantial amount of money had been withheld from his retirement,
which he assumed had gone to his ex-wife.
Then, in a letter dated January 4, 1990 the Office of
Personnel Management informed Plaintiff that he would be receiving
money back that was erroneously withheld from his checks.

This

he assumed indicated that the government had withheld too much on
behalf of his ex-wife.

These payments and letters all occurred

prior to his learning that he would not be eligible for the lump
sum retirement annuity.
At the time of the hearing on April 6, 1990 it was learned
5

that the Office of Personnel Management had through its own error,
sent all the retirement benefits to the Plaintiff and had informed
Defendant's counsel that Defendant would receive all the back
retirement payments due her in the near future and that Plaintiff
would be further assessed from his retirement for money sent to
him in error.

(Tp. 32-34)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

That the Plaintiff presented to the Trial Court numerous
changes of circumstances which under UCA Section 3 0-3-5

would

allow Plaintiff to gain relief from the alimony awarded in the
Divorce Decree.
The Trial Court incorrectly determined that the voluntary
nature of some of the changes made the Defendant ineligible for
a modification.

The correct rule is for the Court to look at the

totality of the circumstances and allow each of the changes to
apply

such

weight

towards

a

modification

as

the

Court

can

determine.
The Court also erred in awarding Plaintiff to pay Defendant's
attorney's fees.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT
THERE HAD BEEN NO SHOWING OF A SUBSTANTIAL
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES ALLOWING THE COURT TO
MODIFY THE DIVORCE DECREE BY CEASING OR
SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCING ALIMONY.
The Utah Supreme Court has on numerous occasions, spelled out
the law as indicated

in Utah Code Annotated, Section
6

30-3-5,

(1953) as amended.

In the case of Westenskow v. Westenskow, 562

P.2d 1256, (1977) Utah Supreme Court:
"That section provides the Court with
continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent
changes or new orders with respect to support
and maintenance of the parties and the
children."
The obligation of the Plaintiff in the present case is
outlined in the case of Haslam v. Haslam, 657 P.2d, 757 (1982).
In the Haslam case the Supreme Court reiterated the general rule
that:
"The party seeking modification of a Divorce
Decree must demonstrate a substantial change
of circumstances."
Plaintiff understood that general rule in the present case
and proceeded, in the hearing for modification, to present to the
Trial Court the following seven (7) changes in circumstances:
1.

PLAINTIFF'S

PERMANENT

REDUCTION

OF

INCOME

DUE TO

RETIREMENT, WITH HIS INCOME DECREASING FROM $4000 PER MONTH TO A
LITTLE MORE THAN $1500 PER MONTH. By May of 1989, when Plaintiff,
who had been contemplating retirement for some time based upon his
ailing health, learned that if he did not retire before June 4,
1989 he and his ex-wife would lose any rights they had to his lump
sum annuity payment.

At that time, Plaintiff had put in over

thirty (3 0) years of government service and was entitled to retire
with full benefits and therefore, he chose to accept retirement
as of the 4th day of June, 1989 in an effort to reserve his rights
to the lump sum annuity payment.
This

action

resulted

in
7

a

substantial

change

of

circumstances, both to himself and to his ex-wife.

Plaintifffs

income immediately decreased from $4000 per month to a gross
monthly annuity rate of $2021.

Plaintiff believed that between

himself and Defendant they would receive a lump sum payment in the
amount of $29,7 39.
In addition, Defendant would receive, out of Plaintiff's
monthly annuity rate, $312 per month retirement for as long as
Plaintiff lived. Plaintiff simultaneously retired and petitioned
the Court for a modification in the Divorce Decree relieving him
of the requirement to continue paying alimony for the last year
of his stipulated Decree.
Plaintiff argues that the net affect of this retirement was
to reduce his net income to approximately $1500 per month and
increasing the income per month available to the Defendant by $312
per month, exclusive of alimony,.
Finally, there is no guarantee Plaintiff would live long
enough to retire at age 65. Were he to die earlier, the Defendant
would be deprived of these retirement benefits entirely.
2.

DEFENDANT'S

RETIREMENT.

INCREASE

IN INCOME

DUE TO

PLAINTIFF'S

Because of Plaintiff's retirement, Defendant has an

increase in her income in the amount of $312 per month, which was
not available to her at the time the alimony award was entered in
the Divorce Decree;
3.

DEFENDANT'S INCREASE IN INCOME DUE TO HER EMPLOYMENT AND

HER CURRENT ABILITY TO MAINTAIN HER LIFESTYLE AND EXPENSES.

At

the time of the Stipulation in this divorce matter, Defendant
8

reported that she was working only part time and her income was
less than $375 per month.

At the time of the hearing on the

Petition to Modify, Defendant reported that her income was now
$895 per month.
The hearing record is cluttered as to exactly when the
Defendant received her increase in income from her employment and
Plaintiff believes it is because Defendant remembers that she
reported her income was only $375 at the time the Stipulation was
worked out and that she was either not being completely honest as
to her income at that time or that she was not being honest as to
when that income change occurred at the hearing on Plaintifffs
Petition to Modify.

In either regard, the Stipulation was based

upon her having the lesser income.
The Courts have reviewed a number of Petitions to Modify
support awards in Divorce Decrees and one (1) major issue that the
Courts examine is, can the wife continue to maintain herself
economically if the modification is allowed.

In this case and

according to Defendant's Exhibit "10", the Defendant was earning
a gross income of $895, was receiving $661 for two (2) children
in

social

security

benefits

and

is now

receiving

$312

in

retirement benefits from the Plaintiff. This is a total of $1867
per month.
Defendant's own Exhibit "10" indicates that her ongoing
expenses required for her continued substanence at the level which
she is currently living is $1713.08. Therefore, it is clear that
with the income Plaintiff is receiving from employment, combined
9

with the retirement income, that she is making enough to meet her
needs, plus a substantial monthly cushion.
The evidence is equally clear that the Plaintiff, even
without the ongoing alimony and alimony Judgment ordered by the
Trial Court, is not making enough to meet his needs and if
required to pay alimony beyond his date of retirement, will be
forced far below the minimum poverty level;
4.

DEFENDANT'S DECREASE IN EXPENSES DUE TO THE SALE OF THE

MARITAL HOME. The major reason for an alimony payment of any kind
in this case was based upon the fact that Defendant was adamant
about receiving the family home in Brigham City, Utah.

The

Defendant indicated during the time passing between the filing of
the divorce and the final Stipulation that she was attempting to
sell the residence.
However, Plaintiff felt that her efforts were half hearted
at best.

At any rate, Defendant had from the time of the filing

of the divorce through the time she actually sold the home, over
three

(3) years to try and dispose of that property.

The

Defendant made the claim at the hearing on the Petition to Modify
that the reason she finally sold the home was that she reduced the
price due to the fact that she could not afford it without the
Plaintiff1s alimony payments.
The fact remained that if she indeed was trying to sell it
throughout that period of time as she testified she was, she must
surely have had an inflated view of the home's worth all along and
was not willing during that period of time, to reduce the price
10

to

a

level

which

would

actually

allow

the

sale.

Only

the

Defendant really knows whether the lack of alimony was the real
cause for her selling the home at the time she did and for the
price she did.
It does seem suspect in that after taking so long to sell
during a period of time in which she was allegedly trying to do
so, that she was able to sell it so quickly after the alimony
decreased.

This certainly leads one to consider that it is very

likely that the Defendant decided to get serious about selling the
home prior to the lack of alimony payments and that these efforts
finally paid off when they did and she was finally able to sell
the home.
The case at the time of the divorce was void of the typical
reasons for requiring alimony payments.

There were no children

born of this marriage and children that the Defendant had in her
custody

were

amply

supported

by

substantial

social

security

benefits they received due to their father's passing away.

The

children in the home were not too young to allow the Defendant to
leave the home and work.
The Defendant in this case was reasonably educated and fully
capable of employment in a number of activities, but chose to work
in the library in the local school because she wanted to stay in
Brigham City, Utah.

She reported at the time of the divorce, that

she hoped that the position would become full time, allowing her
to receive a living wage;
5.

PLAINTIFF'S LACK OF CASH FLOW AND INCREASE IN DEBT DUE
11

TO HIS RELIANCE ON THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDING HIM AND HIS EX-WIFE
WITH A LUMP SUM PAYMENT FROM HIS ANNUITY AND BEGINNING TIMELY
PAYMENTS ON HIS RETIREMENT.
At

the

time

the

Plaintiff

made

the

decision

to

accept

retirement, he was told that he and his ex-wife would receive
their shares of lump sum annuity in a reasonably timely manner
after his retirement and that the government would then begin
timely payments of the monthly retirement to both of them.

That

Plaintiff then found he was ineligible for the lump sum annuity
at all and was dismayed that he would not have that lump payment
to assist him with his relocation to Pennsylvania.
The Plaintiff was also greatly concerned that the Defendant,
would also not receive her lump sum payment which he counted on
as a buffer between her lack of alimony and the beginning of
monthly retirement payments.
Exhibit " 2 " was introduced by Plaintiff to give the Court an
understanding of what the Plaintiff and his family had to do to
try and survive during the year long period that it took the
bureaucracy to figure out what to do with Plaintiff's retirement
and to make the determination that he was not eligible for the
lump sum payments.

It took that long as well for the government

to start making any retirement payments.

As a result and due to

no fault of the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff was completely without
income for the better part of a year.
Consequently, the Defendant also ran into some lean times
financially

because her

share

of the
12

retirement

was held

up

inexplicably by the government for over eight (8) months.
The Defendant, as she testified and as presented in Exhibit
"10", with the income she was making and the $661 per child for
two (2) children, made very close to enough money to get by, even
without the retirement.
However, as stated earlier the Plaintiff was in the position
of

trying

to

support

whatsoever.

It

retirement

income

his

family

is important
in

the

to

of

four

(4)

reiterate

interim

from

on

no

that the

income
lack of

Plaintiff!s

actual

retirement and the end of the year when the government finally
made those payments, was due to no fault of the Plaintiff.
The Trial Court seemed to infer that Plaintiff had something
to do with the Defendant not receiving her share of the retirement
during that period of time, when in fact the Exhibits presented
at the hearing

and countless

other efforts

initiated

by

the

Plaintiff show that he attempted to get the regular retirement
income coming, as well as the lump sum payments for both parties.
6.

PLAINTIFF'S INCREASE IN HIS COST OF LIVING DUE TO HIS

REMARRIAGE TO A WOMAN WITH A DISABILITY AND TWO (2) CHILDREN FROM
A PREVIOUS MARRIAGE. The Plaintiff remarried a woman, now Lucille
McElwain, who had two (2) children from a prior marriage.

These

children were not being properly treated by her ex-husband and
were not being properly supported either.

The Plaintiff and his

new wife hoped to be able to move from the California area at the
time of his retirement and provide a stable home environment for
the two (2) children.

The parties had negotiated with the ex13

husband and had made arrangements to adopt the children so that
their lives would not be interrupted adversely by the ex-husband.
The parties were unable to complete the adoptions, and the
ex-husband continued to failed to pay child support.

As a result,

Plaintiff wound up as the step-father of these children and the
only one available to provide for their support.
Plaintiff's

new
make

wife,
it

Lucille,
impossible

suffers
for

her

from

physical

to

maintain

infirmities

that

employment.

As a result, Plaintiff is the sole bread winner for

the family and he attempted to support a family of four (4) on a
greatly reduced income which resulted in a substantial change in
his finances.
In the case of Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d, 1297,
(1981), the Supreme Court of Utah indicated:
"That the modification of a Divorce Decree,
as a matter of equity, is the duty and
prerogative of the Supreme Court to review
both the facts and the law."
Interestingly, the Court also indicated:
"That while the fact that the ex-husband has
two (2) children by a second marriage could
possibly a show change in circumstances,
substantially enough to warrant modification
of child support provisions of the Divorce
Decree
"
This language

indicates that the Supreme Court is willing to

consider voluntary changes of circumstances, such as the addition
of children

in a new marriage

to warrant

the possibility

of

modifying support orders in a previous marriage.
In the case of Openshaw v. Openshaw, 639 P. 2d, 177 (1981) the
14

Supreme Court in another decision further explained the stated law
by stating that:
"In determining whether to modify a Divorce
Decree, it is proper to consider obligations
incurred since the divorce to support a new
family, including a step-child,11
The Court went back to the case of Wright v. Wright, 586
P.2d, 443 (Utah 1978), which held that:
"Undertaking to support step-children does not
relieve the parent of his obligation to
support his own natural children."
and

points

out

that

the

law,

in

1979, was

changed

by

the

Legislature in Section 78-45-4.1 (1953) as amended, which provides
that:
"The step-parent shall support a step-child
to the same extend that a natural or adopted
parent is required to support a child."
The Court made it clear in its decision that the obligation
to support a second family does not replace the obligation to
support the first family.

However, it makes it very clear that

it is certainly a factor to be considered in making a modification
of a Divorce Decree and the Court, in the Openshaw case affirmed
the Trial Court!s reduction of support.
These cases and the statutes referred to above make it clear
that these lesser changes of circumstances found in the present
case can and should be used where appropriate to modify support
payments awarded in Divorce Decrees.
7.

DUE TO PLAINTIFF'S HEALTH AND HIS AGE,

IT IS VERY

UNLIKELY THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO REGAIN EMPLOYMENT WITH THE SAME

15

INCOME LEVEL HE PREVIOUSLY HAD AND A REAL QUESTION WHETHER HE
SHOULD DO IT EVEN IF HE COULD.

Plaintiff is 60 years old and has

put in thirty five (35) years of public service through the Navy
and through his Civil Service employment.

During his employment

he has risen through the ranks and gained positions of great
responsibility and stress which result in being paid a decent
income.
However, this type of employment has not been without cost
to the Plaintiff.

He has not been able to live where he has

desired, because his employment was always subject to transfer.
The high level responsibility which he has assumed through his
employment has caused him considerable stress, both professionally
and in his domestic life, with the result being a number of
serious ulcers and other related health problems.
This case does not present the Court with the situation where
a husband who knows a divorce is pending makes a radical change
in the prime of his professional career in an attempt to make it
impossible for an ex-wife to collect fair support.

Rather, this

is the case of a 60 year old man making a determination that due
to internal and external factors, the time had come for him to
retire from his professional career.
He attempted to do so in such a way that his financial
obligations and social responsibilities would continue to receive
the necessary consideration they deserved.

The Plaintiff in this

case was fully entitled to retire. He had been eligible to do so
for many years. He was told by his employment that if he did not
16

retire at the time he did, he would lose a substantial financial
benefit that he would have no way of regaining.

His motives in

retiring were perfectly legitimate and honorable.
This case, unlike many of the cases of a similar nature that
come before this Court, presents a true win/win situation for both
parties.

The Plaintiff in this case was able to retire at an age

when he was still physically able to enjoy retirement to some
respect and the Defendant receives the huge benefit of being able
to draw on her rights to his retirement for a full five (5) years
prior to the time that the Plaintiff would have been forced to
retire.
In fact, Plaintiff did not act with the intention to hurt the
Defendant at all.

It was his absolute belief that the move would

be advantageous to both of them; and
These seven (7) elements demonstrated by the Plaintiff at the
hearing to modify the Decree provided the Trial Court with more
than enough evidence to find that there had

in fact, been a

substantial change in circumstance.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY APPLIED THE LAW
BY RULING THAT THE VOLUNTARY NATURE OF SOME
OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CHANGES IN CIRCUMSTANCES
MADE THOSE CHANGES, PER SE, INAPPLICABLE
TOWARDS MODIFYING A DIVORCE DECREE.
The Judge f s ruling in the present case is sketchy at best and
difficult to follow as he hops around to different statements that
he

seems

decision.

to be

espousing

as

legal

doctrine

to back up

his

The Trial Judge seems to be saying that any change of
17

circumstances that does not result directly from an act of God or
one

forced

at

gun

point,

cannot

be

used

circumstance for modifying a Divorce Decree.

as

a

change

of

The case law in Utah

simply does not support the Judge ! s finding in this matter.
Judge Gunnell also threw out language regarding a test in
the

"Moore v.

Felmer case"

(Tp. 105) , which

is a case

plaintiff's attorney has not been able to locate.
Gunnell

states that this test requires that

However, Judge

"is she able to

support herself now differently than she was at the time".
105)

that

(Tp.

Judge Gunnell ! s finding here appears to be directly counter

to the evidence presented at the hearing which clearly indicated
that with Defendant's income and the retirement income she would
be receiving from Plaintiff's retirement, that she would have more
than enough money than was necessary to meet her monthly expenses.
Judge Gunnell went on to say that he was swayed by the fact
that Plaintiff filed this Petition within four (4) months of the
time the Divorce Decree was signed by the preceding Judge on the
24th day of February, 1988.

Judge Gunnell was grossly in error

as to the time frame considered, as this Petition was filed almost
a year and four (4) months after the Divorce Decree was signed.
Perhaps if the Trial Court had not been operating under that
misconception, the Court would have taken a Tftore careful look at
the actual change of circumstance that did occur.
The issue raised by this case is one that has been raised
before this Court on numerous occasions.

There is a large body

of prior case law from which to derive guidance in deciding this
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particular issue.
As the Court took particular interest in the issue of the
voluntary aspect of Plaintiff's change of circumstances, Plaintiff
would ask this Court to review those specific cases referred to
by defense counsel in closing arguments at the hearing on Petition
to Modify.
Defense counsel (Tp. 96) listed the cases of Westenskow v.
Westenskow, 562 P.2d, 1256 (1977 Supreme Court) and Cumminqs v.
Cummings, 562 P.2d, 229 (1977 Supreme Court) and finally, Carter
v. Carter, 563 P.2d, 177 (1977 Supreme Court).
statement in closing that these three

Counsel made the

(3) cases stand for the

principle,
"That a person is not entitled to voluntarily
change their income circumstances and then be
able to claim before the Court a reduction in
their obligations. Of course, the reason for
that is then everyone would do it. Everyone
would start their own business or go to France
to fulfill their life long dream to live on
the left bank of the Seime and paint and send
a letter home saying "I am sorry, I don't have
any money because I don ! t work anymore, so I
can't send you any. That is the evil that that
rule prevents and that is what is wrong here
with the entire argument of Mr. McElwain".
(Tp. 96)
In reviewing those cases in the order presented by defense
counsel in closing argument, we find that the Supreme Court in
fact did not delineate such a rule, but rather reviewed the issue
of

changes

of

circumstances

in

enlightened way.
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a

much

more

flexible

and

In the Westenskow case the husband had brought an action for
a divorce from his wife and was making approximately $18,000 per
year, two (2) months prior to the divorce hearing.

In that case

the husband terminated his employment to start his own business
just before the divorce and reported at the divorce hearing that
he was making only $600 per month.
The Trial Court in that case presided over by the Honorable
Ronald O. Hyde of the Second Judicial District Court of Weber
County,

State

of

Utah,

made

a

finding

of

alimony

that

appropriately took into account the fact that the husband ! s income
was temporarily reduced and awarded alimony on a graduating scale
of $75 for the first six (6) months, $100 for the next six (6)
months and $150 for the following four (4) years.
The husband himself testified at Trial that he "expected his
income to improve11 and the Supreme Court reviewing the husband1 s
appeal indicated that
"It would be reasonable for the Court to infer
that either Plaintifffs income from his
business would increase or he would seek other
employment
with
adequate
remuneration
reflecting his historical earning ability."
and found the Trial Court's award of alimony to be "well tailored
to a situation which is not ordinary".
Nowhere in this decision is there any statement of a rule
that the husband was not entitled to consideration of his change
of circumstances due to the voluntary nature of the change.

In

fact, the Court took the position that the husband was young,
upwardly mobile and reading between the lines, probably felt that
20

the evidence was that he had quit to avoid possible payments to
his wife.
In

Westenskow

the

Trial

Court

reduced

the

alimony

substantially from what it would have been had he continued making
$18,000 per year at the time of the finding and in fact, the
Supreme Court ruled that if
"Plaintiff's income has been seriously and
permanently diminished, he may avail himself
of l!UCA 30-3-5" to prove the necessity for a
modification."
Clearly

inferring

that

even

in this

case

where

the

husband

abruptly changed his lifestyle and professional position just
prior to coming to Court on the divorce, that if the husband were
able to show that the change in circumstance was permanent, that
he would be entitled to avail himself of the same provision of
the law used by the Plaintiff in the present case.
The Westenskow case clearly does not stand for the principal
proposed by defense counsel in the present case and accepted by
the Trial Court.
In fact, Westenskow seems to stand for the fact that in a
case

like the present

one where

the change

in

circumstances

regarding Plaintifffs*income is clearly a permanent one, that the
Plaintiff is entitled to return to the Court for a modification
based on a substantial change of circumstance.
This language in Westenskow does not even take into account
the fact that Plaintiff's decision in the present case actually
works a financial benefit to the Defendant.
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Next, in the Cummings case the Court found a strange request
by the husband to modify the Divorce Decree in regards to alimony
based upon his alleged change of economic circumstances. However,
in that case the Defendant had a three (3) year history of making
an average of $20,000 per year and had to admit on the stand that
although his income had temporarily decreased to $77 5 because he
had accepted a position as a Checker in a grocery store, which
would soon turn into a position of Manager, that he also was
receiving

income from an investment of approximately

$400 per

month and payments from sale of a restaurant in the amount of $47 0
per month and would receive in that same year, a down payment of
$5000,

The

determined

Court,

that

the

taking

advantage

Defendant's

of

simple

available

arithmetic,

income

was

the

equivalent of $2 0,000 per year and that therefore, there had no
change of circumstances at all.
The Court indicated that it was the responsibility of the
Court to "consider the parties respected economic sources", it
must determine what constitutes the equitable share each should
contribute to the household to maintain the family according to
their station in life.
The Supreme Court found that the Trial Court f s decision not
to modify

was

appropriate

under

the

circumstances

where

the

husband had available the equivalent salary he had previously
earned and in addition, was about to improve that position by
accepting full time managerial position.
Nowhere in the Cummings case does the Supreme Court rule that
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because

Plaintiff's

alleged

changes

of

circumstances

were

voluntary, that they were not available to be considered in a
modification of a Divorce Decree.

That case merely determined

that the Plaintiff's situation had not changed and further, that
it in fact appeared to be improving.
Applying the test actually delineated by the Supreme Court
in the Cummincrs case would force a Trial Court to find in the
present case that there was reason to consider a modification.
As previously

stated, with the added retirement income, the

Defendant in the present case, had more than enough financial
contribution to continue her financial station in life.

The

Plaintiff on the other hand had drawn to the very bottom of his
economic

resources

and

simply

did

not

have

the

financial

capability to continue paying alimony under the circumstances as
they had changed.
That leaves the case of Carter v. Carter in our effort to
search for the Supreme Court's rule on voluntariness of change in
determining modifications in Decrees as applied by Judge Gunnell
in the present case.
In the Carter case the husband requested a modification of
the Divorce Decree regarding alimony alleging that his earning
capacity in construction had decreased from $21,000 per year to
approximately $12,000 per year due to his seriously impaired
health.
In this case the Trial Court had prior knowledge of testimony
presented by this same husband when he had testified that he "was
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a competent cattleman".

It seems apparent that the Trial Court

simply did not believe that this self employed individual really
had a change in circumstances which was severely limiting his
income at the present time.

But, the Court went on to make some

very specific statements about the state of the law in cases of
this type.
The Court stated that
"the husband is mistaken in his assumption
that the amount of alimony payable should be
correlated in percentage to his income, to be
scaled up or down as his income may vary.
His earning capacity and his income are of
course, important factors to be considered.
But, that
is only part of the total
circumstances to be considered as to what is
appropriate an equitable. Another major one
is
what
are
Plaintiff f s
needs
and
requirements; and there is no showing that
there has been any decrease therein.11
In the present case again, the evidence at Trial was that
with the increase provided by the retirement income, that the
Defendant would have more than enough income to meet her needs.
Further, there was a specific showing of a decrease in the
Defendant's needs and requirements due to the sale of her home
which had a substantially higher monthly payment requirement.

The

Court made it clear that it assumed that the ex-husbandfs income
was likely to go up and down over the course of his life and that
a lone was not the sole factor upon which alimony would be based.
The only reference by the Supreme Court in the Carter case
to voluntary change of circumstances concerns where the ex-husband
in Carter alleged that his subsequent remarriage was causing added
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financial obligations, the Court said:
"It
is
usually
said
that
subsequent
obligations voluntary acquired should not
reduce obligations under a prior Divorce
Decree.
While this is the primary and
fundamental rule, it is likewise not absolute,
but is still another factor which may be
considered in determining what is equitable
and practical under the total circumstances."
The Court is clearly sending the message that it is not
appropriate for a Trial Court to merely assume that an obligation
voluntary acquired, post-divorce, can simply not be a reason for
modifying a Decree, but in fact, that it can be considered as a
factor when reviewing the total circumstances of each case.
In the present case there is no question that in fact the
Plaintiff's
decreased.

income

has

been

substantially

and

permanently

There is also no question that the act that decreased

Plaintifffs income actually increased the Defendant's income by
$312 per month.

The additional factors as outlined in the seven

(7) changes of circumstances above listed present a totality of
circumstances which clearly Judge Gunnell overlooked when jumping
to what he seemed to feel was an iron clad rule.
A

far

presented

more

before

analogous
this

Court

case

to

is the

the

situation

1982

Utah

currently

Supreme

Court

decision of Haslam v. Haslam.
In the Haslam case the husband filed for a modification of
the Decree claiming that his retirement and his ex-wife's increase
in earnings resulted

in a substantial change of circumstances

allowing termination of the alimony awarded in the prior Divorce
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Decree.
The Trial

Court

found that the ex-husband

was

receiving

social security and pension benefits and stock dividends, as well
as social security for his new wife and her minor child, resulting
in a monthly income of over $1700 per month.

The ex-husband

alleged that he had monthly expenses totally over $1600 per month.
The

ex-wife

at the time

of the

divorce was

unemployed,

but

subsequently secured employment which paid her $1100 per month at
the time of the hearing.

In addition to that, she was able to

draw interest from savings that she had accumulated.
Court

in the

Haslam

case

dismissed

Defendant's

The Trial

Petition

for

Modification finding no material change of circumstances.
The Court reversed and remanded the Trial Court's decision
in Haslam and presented the current status of the law as follows:
"Provisions in the original Decree of Divorce
granting alimony, child support and the like
must be readily susceptible to alteration at
a later date, as the needs which such
provisions were designed to fill are subject
to rapid and unpredictable change."
This rule was previously stated in the case of Folqer v. Folger,
626 P.2d, 412 (Utah 1981).

The Supreme Court in Haslam ruled

"On the instant facts it is clear that there
has
been
a
substantial
change
in
circumstances."
and held that
"under the circumstances of this case we think
that the combination of the supporting spouses
retirement, together with the dependent
spouses employment, earning of a substantial
income and accumulation of substantial savings
subsequent to the original Divorce Decree
constitutes
a
substantial
change
of
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circumstances."
All of the factors referred to in the Haslam case are present
in the

case currently

before this Court.

The

Plaintiff's

retirement and the Defendant increase in income, along with her
reduction

in expenses, resulted

in a substantial

change of

circumstances similar to the one to the changes reguiring a
modification in the Haslam case.
In the present case however, the Plaintiff!s remarriage did
not result in an increase in monthly income to his current family
and in fact, further diluted what financial resources Plaintiff
had.
In addition, in Haslam, the ex-husband's retirement did not
confer a financial benefit to the ex-wife as it does in the
present case.

The Haslam decision was made without dissent.

The 1976 Utah Supreme Court case of Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d,
525, an ex-husband again had to appeal the Trial Court's decision
not to modify his alimony assessment.
The Supreme Court modified the Court's Order by reducing
alimony from $300 per month to $1 per year.

In that case the

former husband's income had increased from $1300 to $2200 per
month and the income of the former wife had increased from $2 2 0
per month to $94 6 per month.

The wife had also been able to

increase her educational station by gaining a Masters Degree.
In the Dehm case, as in the present case, the former wife
could not claim that the alimony she sought was still needed for
her support.

The Court ruled
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"in a situation such as this where the
Defendant is gainfully employed, making a
salary sufficient to satisfy her needs, is
adequately housed and is of good health, one
of the functions of alimony is not to provide
retiring income. We do not want to confuse
alimony with annuity. We conclude that to
award alimony in these circumstances is
neither necessary nor reasonable and reverse
that part of the Trial Court's Order with
instructions to reduce alimony to $1 per
year.,f
The Supreme Court ruled that even though the husband's income had
increased substantially, the fact that the former wife was in a
position to maintain herself on her own income and the other
financial resources available to her, that it was appropriate to
reduce the husband's alimony obligation to virtually nothing.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE DEFENDANT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES
OF THIS CASE
The Trial Court in the present case began its oral decision
by

stating

that

the

case

presented

interesting

and

novel

questions. There was no assertion on the part of anybody that the
Plaintiff was bringing this action frivolously or in bad faith and
certainly the Trial Court made no assertion that he had found
such.

Judge Gunnell ordered that the Plaintiff pay to the

Defendant one-half her attorney's fees as documented by Affidavit
of Defendant's counsel.
This Order under the facts of this case was a clear abuse of
discretion as the Court could not find that there was any evidence
that the Plaintiff had been acting in bad faith or had frivolously
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brought the Petition to Modify and in fact found, that the issues
presented by the case were both novel and interesting to the
Court.

The Court would then have to find that the Defendant was

clearly in need of receiving an award of attorney's fees.
The Utah Court of Appeals case, Porko v. Porko, 752 P. 2d 365,
(1988) stated the rule of law regarding attorney's fees in such
cases,
"That in a divorce action, award of attorney's
fees must be supported by the evidence that
the amount awarded was reasonable and the
party receiving the award was reasonably in
need,"
In the Porko case attorney's fees were in fact granted as the
ex-husband's Petition was brought under circumstances where both
Plaintiff and Defendant's incomes had increased and both their
financial obligations had increased in a like amount.

The Court

specifically found that the former husband's appeal was frivolous
in nature.
There can be no such finding in the present case.

Clearly

the disastrous financial situation of the Plaintiff shows that if
anything, he is in need of attorney's fees and that the Defendant
is provided with an income sufficient to meet her needs and is
able to pay a substantial amount monthly towards the reduction of
whatever fees her attorney is intending to charge her. Therefore,
the Trial Court abused its discretion in awarding to the Defendant
one-half the attorney's fees incurred in this case.
In addition, in reviewing the Affidavit for Attorney's Fees
submitted by defense counsel, it is found that a substantial
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portion of attorney's fees listed in that Affidavit were incurred
by

defense

attorney's

efforts

to

determine

what

the

Federal

government's bureaucratic entanglements had done to his client's
share of the retirement.

These efforts would have been required,

with or withPut the Petition to Modify, as they were required to

particularly necessary to the issues of the modification of the
Divorce Decree.
CONCLUSION
That at the hearing on Plaintiff's Petition to Modify the
Divorce Decree, the Plaintiff presented the Court with more than
enough

evidence

that

the

parties

circumstances

substantially from the time of the divorce.

had

changed

With that evidence

the Trial Court erred in not granting Plaintiff relief from the
alimony payments by modifying the Decree.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/^ZV^Y
JARD
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct
copies of th0 above and foregoing Plaintiff's Brief to counsel for
the Defendant, Jon Bunderson, Attorney a Law, 45 North First East,
Briqham City* Utah 84302, postage prepaid this
/^y
day of
October, 1990.
~
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30-3.-4.1 to 30-3-4,4. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 230, § 4 repeals
these sections, as last amended by L. 1989, ch
104, §§ 2 to 5, providing for the appointment,
authority, duties, and jurisdiction of court com-

missioners, effective Apnl 23, 1990.
Cross-References. — Court commissioners,
Rule 3-201, Rules of Judicial Administration

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health
care of parties and children — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation —
Termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Alimony.
—Termination.
Children.
—Custody.
Modification.
—Support.
Modification.
Costs.
Court's powers and jurisdiction.
Property division.
—Antenuptial agreement
—Closely-held corporations.
—Professional practice.
—Retirement funds.
—Time of valuation.
Stipulations and agreements of parties.
Visitation rights.
Cited
Alimony.
—Termination.
The test of whether termination of alimony
is appropriate is whether plaintiff is able to
provide for herself a standard of living equal to
that enjoyed during the marriage of the parties. Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d
241 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Children.
—Custody.
Custody award to the mother, who had remarried and taken the children to another
state, was affirmed, where the trial court had
considered the needs of the children and the
parties' ability to provide for these needs, and
had considered as factors in the custody determination the identity of the primary caretaker,
the needs of the children for stability m their
environment, and the identity of the parent
who could provide personal care Myers v
Myers, 768 P 2d 979 (Utah Ct. App 1989)

Modification.
If the initial award was based on a thorough
examination by the trial court of the various
factors relevant to the child's welfare, a rigid
application of the "change-in-circumstances"
criterion is in order. In such a case, the court
has already considered the best interests of the
child and made a determination consistent
with that finding. Any subsequent petition for
modification of custody must overcome a high
threshold in order to protect the child from
''ping-pong" custody awards and the accompanying instability so damaging to a child's
proper development. Maughan v. Maughan,
770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
If the initial custody award is premised on a
temporary condition, a choice between marginal custody arrangements, a default decree,
or similar exceptional criteria, the trial court
may properly focus its inquiry into the effects
on the child of the established custodial relationship as it has developed over time.
Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).
There was no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's failure, after two days of often conflicting testimony about child care and supervision, housekeeping, promiscuity, and sexual
abuse, to find a substantial change of circumstances of the custodial parent that would require a modification of the custody award.
Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).
—Support.
There was no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's determination that husband, although
serving a prison sentence, should pay more
than nominal child support, and m ordering
that unpaid child support be subtracted
monthly from his equity interest in the marital
home Proctor v Proctor, 773 P.2d 1389 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).
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HUSBAND AND WIFE
brokering the purchase and sale of dental practices, was not an abuse of discretion. Sorensen
v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820 (Utah Ct App.
1989).
Trial court properly considered accounts receivable in its valuation of husband's dental
practice, and any failure to consider the full
amount of accounts payable was harmless
error where the record was ambiguous on that
point. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820
-(Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Modification.
Trial court's apportionment of financial responsibilities will not be upset in the absence
of manifest injustice or inequity that indicates
a clear abuse of discretion. Maughan v.
Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Costs.
In modification of divorce decrees pursuant
to the continuing jurisdiction of the trial court,
the question of the ability or inability of a
party to pay costs in defending the matter is a
factual issue that lies in the discretion of the
trial court. Hardy v. Hardy; 776 P.2d 917
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Courts powers and jurisdiction.
State courts retain their traditional power to
allocate federal tax dependency exemptions
and have the power to order a custodial parent
to execute a declaration in favor of the noncustodial parent, notwithstanding a 1985 amendment to the Internal Revenue Code providing
that the custodial parent is automatically entitled to the available dependency exemptions
unless he or she "signs a written declaration ...
that the custodial parent will not claim the
child as a dependent." Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d
232 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Property division.
—Antenuptial agreement.
A promise in a prenuptial agreement regarding the disposition, upon divorce, of property
brought to the marriage by the parties is unenforceable if it tends unreasonably to encourage
divorce or separation. However, where an offending provision of such an agreement is separable from the rest of-the contract, the
nonoffending provisions are enforceable. Neilson v. Neilson, 117 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (Ct. App.
1989).
—Closely-held corporations.
Order requiring husband to pay out to wife a
portion of the value of the stock in husband's
closely-held corporations' was not an abuse of
discretion/ where an in-kind 'division would
have given the wife a minority interest in assets over which she would have had virtually
no control and from which she would have had
no assurance of receiving income. Weston v.
Weston, 773 P.2d 408 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
—Professional practice.
The goodwill of a professional practice is a
marital asset subject to valuation and distribution in the appropriate circumstances.
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).
Trial court's valuation of the goodwill of husband's dental practice, relying on the testimony of a dentist who had been involved in

—Retirement funds.
Decree postponing distribution of the husband's retirement benefits for the purpose of
funding higher child support payments to the
-wife than would otherwise have been appropriate was reversed and remanded for distribuf tion^because the retirement plans of both parties should have been treated as marital assets
and definitively dealt with in the decree as
part of an equitable property distribution between the parties. Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d
232 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
—Time of valuation.
The marital estate should be valued as of the
time of the divorce decree, and subsequent
changes in property value, without additional
compelling reasons, do not constitute a substantial change in circumstances upon which
the trial court may enter a modification of a
decree of divorce. Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Stipulations and agreements of parties.
If the parties' stipulation is accepted by the
trial'court and incorporated into its order, the
subject matter of the stipulation is within the
continuing' jurisdiction of the court. Myers v.
Myers, 768 P.2d 979 (Utah Ct. App." 1989);
Gates v. Gates, 128 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Ct.
App. 1990).
A party may not obtain a stipulation based
on a misrepresentation or material omission of
facts and later claim that a child support order
cannot be modified because there has been no
material^ change in circumstances based on
those * same undisclosed or misrepresented
facts. Gates v. Gates, 128 Utah Adv. Rep. 50
(Ct. App. 1990).
Visitation rights.
Visitation order was affirmed, where the
trial judge entered detailed findings of fact to
support his award of custody to the mother
which could be read to support his conclusory
finding on visitation that the visitation schedule he had devised was u in the best interests of
the children." Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Cited in Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Family
Law, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 216.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Family Law, 1989 Utah L.
Rev. 270.
Brigham Young Law Review. — Note,
J.W.F. v. Schoolcraft: The Husband's Rights to
His Wife's Illegitimate Child Under Utah Law,
1989 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 955.
A.L.R. — Separation agreements: enforcea-

bility of provision affecting property rights
upon death of one party prior to final judgment
of divorce, 67 A L.R.4th 237.
Divorce and separation: attributing undisclosed income to parent or spouse for purposes
of making child or spousal support award, 70
AL.R.4th 173.
Divorce: propriety of using contempt proceeding to enforce property settlement award
or order, 72 A.L.R.4th 298.

30-3-5.2. Allegations of child abuse or child sexual abuse
— Investigation.
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request for modification of a
divorce decree, an allegation of child abuse or child sexual abuse is made,
implicating either party, the court shall order that an investigation be conducted by the Division of Family Services within the Department of Human
Services in accordance with Part 5, Chapter 4 of Title 62A. A final award of
custody or visitation may not be rendered until a report on that investigation
is received by the court. That investigation shall be conducted by the Division
of Family Services within 30 days of the court's notice and request for an
investigation.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-5.2, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 90, § 1; 1990, ch. 183, § 14.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-

ment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted
"Human" for "Social" in the first sentence.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Investigation.
—Time for request.
Husband's request for an investigation was
untimely when he did not request an investiga-

tion until after the court had decided the case.
Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).

30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or divorce — Custody consideration.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Change of custody.
Factors in determining child's best interest.
Findings required.
Change of custody.
In change-of-custody cases involving a
nonlitigated custody decree, a trial court, in
applying the changed-circumstances test,
should receive evidence on changed circumstances and that evidence may include evidence that pertains to the best interests of the
child In ruling, the trial court should give sta-

bility and continuity the weight that is appropriate in light of the duration of the existing
custodial relationship and the general welfare
of the child. The findings of fact should show
that the court considered stability as a factor
in the custody decision and indicate the weight
the court gave it. Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599
(Utah 1989).
Factors in determining child's best interest.
Award of custody to the mother was reversed
and custody was awarded to the father on ap-
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(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge
by majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties
of a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial
Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme
Court.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection
(1), divided and rewrote the former third sentence, which read "Thereafter, the term of of-

fice of a judge of the Court of Appeals is 6 years
and until a successor is appointed and approved under Section 20-1-7.1," into the
present third and fourth sentences and made
minor stylistic changes,

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims
department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those involving
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
9
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(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988,
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch.
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment by ch. 73, effective April 25, 1988, inserted subsection designations (a) and (b) in
Subsection (1); inserted "resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings" in Subsection (2)(a);
substituted "state agencies" for "state and local
agencies" in Subsection (2)(a); substituted "informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies" for "them" in Subsection (2)(a); deleted
"notwithstanding any other provision of law"
at the end of Subsection (2)(a); inserted Subsection (b); redesignated former Subsections (2)(b)
to (2)(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); added
"except those from the small claims department of a circuit court" at the end of Subsection (2)(d); and made minor stylistic changes.
The 1988 amendment by ch. 210, effective
April 25, 1988, added Subsection (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsection (2)(h) as Subsection (2)(i).
The 1988 amendment by ch. 248, effective
April 25, 1988, in Subsection (2)(a), rewrote
the phrase before "except" which had read "the

final orders and decrees of state and local agencies or appeals from the district court review of
them"; deleted "notwithstanding any other
provision of law" at the end of Subsection
(2)(a); inserted present Subsection (2)(b); designated former Subsections (2)(b) to (2)(h) as
Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); and substituted
'first degree or capital felony" for "first or capital degree felony" in present Subsection (2)(f).
The 1990 amendment by ch. 80, effective
April 23, 1990, rewrote Subsection (2)(g),
which read "appeals from orders on petitions
for extraordinary writs involving a criminal
conviction, except those involving a first degree or capital felony" and made punctuation
changes in Subsections (2)(h) and (3).
The 1990 amendment by ch. 224, effective
April 23, 1990, inserted the subdivision designation (i) in Subsection (2)(b) and added Subsection (2)(b)(ii), and made related stylistic
changes.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Cross-References. — Composition and jurisdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15,
39-6-16.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Habeas corpus proceedings.
Post-conviction review.
Scope.
Cited.
Habeas ^corpus proceedings.
The language of Subsection (2)(g) is sufficiently broad to include those cases where a
criminal conviction is involved in a habeas corpus proceeding challenging extradition.
Hernandez v. Hayward, 764 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
The Court of Appeals lacked original appellate jurisdiction of an appeal from the denial of
an extraordinary writ involving an interstate
transfer of a prisoner which bore no relation to
his underlying criminal conviction, except that
"but for" the conviction, he would not have
been incarcerated in Arizona and then transferred to Utah. Ellis v. DeLand, 783 P.2d 559
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Post-conviction review.
Post-conviction review may be used to attack
a conviction in the event of an obvious injustice
or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right in the trial. Gomm v. Cook,
754 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Scope.
This statute defines the outermost limits of
appellate jurisdiction, allowing the Court of
Appeals to review agency decisions only when
the legislature expressly authorizes a right of
review. It is not a catchall provision authorizing the court to review the orders of every administrative agency for which there is no statute specifically creating a right to judicial review. DeBry v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Appeals, 764 P.2d 627 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Cited in Scientific Academy of Hair Design,
Inc. v. Bowen, 738 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. App.
1987); In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
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78-45-4.1. Duty of stepparent to support stepchild — Effect of termination of marriage or common law
relationship.
A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same extent that a natural or
adoptive parent is required to support a child. Provided, however, that upon
the termination of the marriage or common law relationship between the
stepparent and the child's natural or adoptive parent the support obligation
shall terminate.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 78-45-4.1, e n a c t e d b y L.
1979, ch. 131, § 2; L. 1980, ch. 42, § 1.

C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Adoption, Chapter 30
of this title.
Divorce, maintenance of parties, § 30-3-5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
no evidence that the mother had attempted to
collect support from the n a t u r a l father, even
though the stepfather had married the mother
prior to the child's birth, and at one time had
claimed the child as his own. Wiese v. Wiese,
699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985).

Equitable estoppel.
Since courts are reluctant to use an equitable estoppel theory to impose a support obligation on a m a n who is not the biological father
of a child, a stepfather was not equitably estopped from denying liability where there was

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
J o u r n a l of C o n t e m p o r a r y L a w .
Wiese v. Wiese: Support Obligations
parents — The Utah Supreme Court
by Estoppel, 12 J. Contemp. L. 305

— Note,
of StepToppled
(1987).

A.L.R. — Stepparent's postdivorce duty to
support stepchild, 44 A.L.R.4th 520.

78-45-4.2. Natural or adoptive p a r e n t has primary obligation of support — Right of stepparent to recover
support.
Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve the natural parent or adoptive
parent of the primary obligation of support; furthermore, a stepparent has the
same right to recover support for a stepchild from the natural or adoptive
parent as any other obligee.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 78-45-4.2, e n a c t e d b y L.
1979, «qh. 131, § 3.
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Adoption, Chapter 30
of this title.

Child support collection, Chapter 45d of this
title.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
J o u r n a l of C o n t e m p o r a r y L a w . — Note,
Wiese v. Wiese: Support Obligations of Step-

parents — The Utah Supreme Court Toppled
by Estoppel, 12 J. Contemp. L. 305 (1987).
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